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GRANDPARENT VISITATION: THE ONE AND ONLY 
STANDARD-BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. Fairbanks 
v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A special relationship often develops between children and their 
grandparents. Despite the unique nature of this bond, it is often 
hard for such relationships to endure changes in the family unit. 
Even during the most civil of divorces, for example, the sensitive 
issue of child visitation may result in bitterness and resentment among 
the parties involved. These parties include not only the parents and 
the children, but quite often the grandparents. The issue of whether 
grandparents are entitled to visitation privileges, and under what 
circumstances, has recently surfaced in Fairbanks v. McCarter, I a 
1993 Maryland court of appeals decision. In Fairbanks, the court 
interpreted Maryland's grandparent visitation statute2 to require only 
that a trial court determine whether grandparental visitation is in the 
child's best interest.3 The court also held that the Maryland statutory 
provision does not require grandparents seeking visitation rights to 
demonstrate any exceptional circumstances. 4 
In Fairbanks, the parents of two minor children divorced in 
1988.5 The divorce proceedings ended three years later, and a decree 
was rendered granting joint legal custody to the parents. 6 The decree 
I. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
·2. 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-
102 (Supp. 1994». 
3. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126. 
4. [d. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126. Common law required the existence of exceptional 
circumstances before visitation rights could be granted to grandparents. See 
infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing exceptional circumstances 
standard and providing examples of exceptional circumstances). 
5. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123. 
6. [d. The term "joint custody" consists of two distinct concepts: (1) legal custody 
and (2) physical custody. Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 296, 508 A.2d 964, 
967 (1986). "Legal custody carries with it the right and obligation to make 
long range decisions involving education, religious training, discipline, medical 
care, and other matters of major significance concerning the child's life and 
welfare." [d. With joint legal custody, both parents have an equal voice in 
making such decisions, and neither parent's rights are superior to the other. 
[d.; see infra note 7 (discussing physical custody). 
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named the father as the custodial parene while the mother retained 
the right to visit the children every other weekend, two weeks during 
the summer, and on certain holidays.8 
The paternal grandparents saw the children frequently through-
out the week while the children were with their father. 9 The maternal 
grandparents, on the other hand, usually saw their grandchildren 
only every other Sunday, while the children were with their mother, 
for a family dinner .10 There were no provisions for grandparental 
visitation in the divorce agreement. 11 Unhappy with this arrangement, 
the maternal grandparents filed a complaint against the father seeking 
independent visitation rights of the children. 12 They alleged that the 
father would not voluntarily expand the time that the children might 
spend with them,13 and thus, they were unable to continue establishing 
a meaningful relationship with their grandchildren. 14 The father an-
swered the complaint by stating that the maternal grandparents had 
adequate access to the children when the children visited their mother .15 
At the subsequent hearing, however, the mother testified that she no 
longer wanted to share her limited visitation time with her parents. 16 
At that hearing, the judge denied the maternal grandparents' 
petition for visitation rights,, 7 The court determined that there were 
7. As the custodial parent, the father was given physical custody of the children. 
Physical custody involves the "right and obligation to provide a home for the 
child and to make the day-to-day decisions required during the time the child 
is actually with the parent having such custody." Taylor, 306 Md. at 296-97, 
508 A.2d at 967 (1986). 
8. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. 
II. [d. 
12. [d. The complaint was filed in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County, 
Maryland. The complaint alleged that, since the divorce, the defendant had 
engaged in a continuous pattern of behavior that prevented the grandparents 
from having reasonable visitation with the children. Complaint for Visitation 
Rights at E.2, Fairbanks (No. C2241). 
13. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123. 
14. Complaint for Visitation Rights at E.2, Fairbanks (No. C2241). 
15. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 43, 622 A.2d at 123. 
16. [d. It is unclear why the mother took this position. She may have genuinely 
decided that she did not have enough time with the children to afford sharing 
any of her time with the maternal grandparents. The decision, on the. other 
hand, may have been the result of ill feelings between the mother and her 
parents. The court raised a red flag at the end of its opinion concerning this 
issue. [d. at 50, 622 A.2d at 127. The court stated: "[f]inally, without in any 
way inferring its presence in this case, a petition for grandparental visitation 
must not. foster collusion between grandparents and a non-custodial parent 
seeking to undo a prior decree and win greater access to the child in question." 
[d. 
17. [d. at 44, 622 A.2d at 123. 
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no exceptional circumstances 18 to warrant any additional visitation 
orders. 19 The maternal grandparents appealed and, on its own initia-
tive, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to 
intermediate appellate review. 20 The court of appeals held that the 
absence of exceptional circumstances was irrelevant.21 Maryland's 
highest court determined that the standard for grandparental visita-
tion in Maryland is not predicated on whether exceptional circum-
stances exist, but rather, solely on the child's best interestY 
II. BACKGROUND 
At common law, prior to the enactment of grandparent visitation 
statutes, grandparents possessed no independent right to visit their 
grandchildren unless either the parents of the child consented to such 
visitation or exceptional circumstances were determined to exist by a 
court. 23 Grandparents' interests were moral, not legal,24 As a result, 
the child's parents maintained virtual autonomy in deciding whether 
the grandparents could visit the grandchildren; judicial oversight was 
minimal. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, granting visi-
tation privileges to the grandparents over the objection of a parent 
constituted reversible error.25 Thus, where the parents refused visi-
tation rights to the grandparents, the grandparents were without legal 
recourse unless exceptional circumstances were present. Exceptional 
circumstances included situations where a parent had died,26 a parent 
was declared unfit,27 a father was on duty in the armed forces,28 and 
where a parent had abandoned the child.29 
18. See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptional cir-
cumstances standard used at common law). 
19. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 44, 622 A.2d at 124. 
20. /d. 
21. Id. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126. 
22. /d. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126. 
23. See Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894); Phyllis C. Borzi, Note, 
Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step Closer to the Best 
Interests of the Child, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 387-89 (1977) (stating that the 
parents' decision controlled unless the grandparent could prove that the cus-
todial parent was unfit); Patricia S. Fernandez, Grandparent Access: A Model 
Statute, 6 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 109, 114 (1988) (stating that grandparents 
had no judicially enforceable right of access to the grandchildren when they 
were in the custody of their parents unless exceptional circumstances existed). 
24. Fernandez, supra note 23, at 114. 
25. Lingwall v. Hoener, 464 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (III. App. Ct. 1984) (citing Chodzko 
v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60 (1976»; see also supra note 23 and accompanying 
text. 
26. Boyles v. Boyles, 302 N.E.2d 199, 201 (III. App. Ct. 1973). 
27. Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894). 
28. Solomon v. Solomon, 49 N.E.2d 807, 808 (III. App. Ct. 1943). 
29. Benner v. Benner, 248 P.2d 425, 426 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
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Policy reasons for the common-law rule included the notion that 
judicial enforcement of grandparental visitation would further divide 
the family unit as well as hinder parental authority. 30 Thus, the 
child's best interest could not be served by forcing the child into the 
"midst of a conflict of authority and ill feelings between parent and 
grandparent. "31 
Furthermore, under the common law, grandparents' rights were 
considered derivative. 32 In other words, the grandparents' rights 
stemmed from a corresponding right enjoyed by the parent. 33 There-
fore, the paternal grandparents could visit the child during the 
father's visitation time and the maternal grandparents could visit the 
child during the mother's visitation time. If a parent did not have 
visitation privileges, then neither did his or her parents. 
Over time, state legislatures began to reject the common-law 
rule. Today, all fifty states have enacted statutes authorizing courts 
to grant visitation rights to grandparents under certain circum-
stances.34 
30. Annotation, Grandparent Visitation Rights, 90 A.L.R.3D 222, 225-26 (1979). 
31. Id. at 226. 
32. See In re Adoption of a Child, 355 A.2d 211,212 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1976) (stating that grandparents' rights are derivative through the natural parent 
unless there is legislation to the contrary). . 
33. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39,48-49, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993). 
34. See ALASKA STAT. § 30-3-4 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (1994); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1994); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3103 (West 
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-59 
(West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 
(West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1994); HAW.' REV. STAT. § 571-46 
(1993); IDAHO CODE § 32-719 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 11-7.1 
(Smith-Hurd 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7.2 (West 1994); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 598.35 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344 (West 1993); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1001-05 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 
§ 9-102 (Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 119, § 39D (1994); MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1994); 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-1 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (Vernon 1993); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1993); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 432B.56O (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17ca (1993); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1994); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2, 50-
13.2A (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3109.051 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1994); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-14 (1994); 
R.l. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420 (Law. Co-op 
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-52 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-
301 (1994); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
30-5-2 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1011 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.2 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 09.240 (West 1994); W. VA. 
CODE § 48-26-1 (1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993); Wyo. STAT. 
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Legislative history surrounding the passage of these statutes is 
virtually nonexistent. 3s These statutes, however, are likely a result of 
increasing divorce rates36 and the strong lobbying efforts of grand-
parents. 37 As divorce often results in both the physical and emotional 
division of a family, a custodial parent may very well deny the ex-
spouse's parents any opportunity to visit the grandchildren, even 
where a strong relationship had previously existed between that 
grandparent and grandchild.38 Grandparent visitation statutes protect 
the ties between grandchildren and their grandparents and recognize 
the nurturing relationship that often exists between them.39 The 
grandparent-grandchild relationship may be especially important to 
a child when divorce divides the nuclear family.40 
Maryland's first statute specifically addressing grandparental vis-
itation rights was enacted in 1981.41 Under section 3-602(a)(4) of the 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated 
Code, a court of equity could: 
[d]etermine who shall have visitation rights to a child. At 
any time following the termination of a marriage, the court 
may consider a petition for reasonable visitation by one or 
more of the grandparents of a natural or adopted child of 
the parties whose marriage has been terminated, and may 
§ 20-7-101 (1994); see also Fernandez, supra note 23, at 117; Kristen Jones 
Indermark, Note, Permissive Intervention-Grandparents' Key to Entering 
Adoption Proceedings, 26 GA. L. REV. 787, 829 n.165 (1992). 
35. Borzi, supra note 23, at 393. 
36. Fernandez, supra note 23, at 115. 
37. See Megan Rosenfeld, Grandparents' Rights: Activists Turn to Court to Protect 
Their Ties to Grandchildren, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at Z12. The number 
of grandparents is growing. It is estimated that as of 1991 there were 58 million 
grandparents, and in the year 2001 there will be 98 million. Id. For a further 
discussion of possible factors influencing the creation of grandparent visitation 
statutes, see Fernandez, supra note 23, at 115-17. 
38. See Fernandez, supra note 23, at 115. 
39. Cf Anne Marie Jackson, Comment, The Coming of Age of Grandparent 
Visitation Rights, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 563, 591 (1994) (stating that guidelines 
for grandparental visitation should consider the nature of the relationship 
between the grandparent and the child, including whether the relationship was 
"a nurturing, caring, relationship"). 
40. Grandparents can comprise a secondary support system or a "safety net" for 
grandchildren when the child's nuclear family divides. Indermark, supra note 
34, at 806-07. During such transitional times, grandparents may offer a calming 
influence on the grandchildren and provide needed stability. Fernandez, supra 
note 23, at 110. 
41. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 (repealed and reenacted by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 296, § 
9-101; renumbered at 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102; current version at MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994». 
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grant such visitation if the court believes it to be in the best 
interests of the child .... 42 
Prior to 1981, this section did not specifically include the language 
regarding grandparents. Rather, section 3-602(a)(4) simply stated that 
a court of equity could "determine who shall have visitation rights 
to a child."43 "[S]ection 3-602(a)(4), prior to the 1981 amendment, 
constituted the broadest possible grant of authority to courts to 
determine who shall be awarded visitation rights."44 Inherent in this 
broad language was the right of a court to grant visitation rights to 
grandparents. 45 Nevertheless, in 1981, the legislature added language 
to the statute specifying grandparents as possible candidates for such 
visitation rights. 46 
The evolution of this statute, as well as its legislative history, 
was examined in Skeens v. Paterno ,47 a 1984 Maryland court of 
special appeals decision. In Skeens, an unmarried minor, Debra 
Skeens, gave birth to the child of Jeffrey Paterno.48 After learning 
of the pregnancy, Paterno proposed to Skeens, but she declined 
Paterno's offer of marriage.49 Skeens subsequently decided to place 
the child up for adoption. 50 Three days after the child was born, 
Paterno brought suit to enjoin Skeens from proceeding with any 
action relative to the child's adoption and also requested custody of 
the child. 51 During the course of the ensuing litigation, the adoption 
issue was withdrawn, leaving only the custody issue. 52 
The trial court awarded custody to Skeens with liberal visitation 
rights to Paterno.53 Because Paterno was an enlisted member of the 
42. Id. 
43. 1975 Md. Laws ch. 317 § 3-602(a)(4) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994)}. 
·44. Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 339,488 A.2d 157, 159 (1985). 
45. See id. at 339-43, 488 A.2d at 159-61; Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 
60, 480 A.2d 820, 826 (1984), overruled by Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 
39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
46. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 (repealed and reenacted by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 296, § 
9-101; renumbered by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102; current version at MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994)} (clarifying that a court may 
grant visitation rights to grandparents of a child). Senate Bill 333 was a 
"culmination of a four-year effort to enact legislation to afford visitation 
rights to grandparents." Evans, 302 Md. at 339, 488 A.2d at 159 (referring to 
S.B. 333, 1981 Sess. (Md. 1981». 
47. 60 Md. App. 48, 480 A.2d 820 (1984), overruled by Fairbanks v. McCarter, 
330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
48. Id. at 53, 480 A.2d at 822. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
5!. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. The trial court stated in its order that the father was entitled to visitation 
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United States Navy, however, his parents were granted vIsItation 
rights with the child while their son was away on duty.54 The court 
of special appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to award the 
paternal grandparents such visitation privileges due to the exceptional 
circumstances. 55 
The Skeens court applied the grandparent visitation statute, 
section 3-602(a)(4).56 The court of special appeals recognized that, 
under the statute, the "ultimate test for custody and visitation is the 
best interests of the child. "57 The' court stated further that custody 
should be granted to a grandparent, as against a parent, only in the 
presence of exceptional circumstances. 58 The same requirement "may 
also be true as, to grandparental visitation." 59 The court held that 
with the child at least "two consecutive days and nights per week, alternating 
major holidays of New Years, Easter, Memorial Day, Thanksgiving and Christ-
mas and six consecutive weeks during the summer months of June, July and 
August of each year." Id. at 55, 480 A.2d at 823. 
54. Id. 
55. [d. at 61-62, 480 A.2d at 826-27. The court of appeals denied the Skeens' 
petition for writ of certiorari. Skeens v. Paterno, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 
(1984). 
56. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 (repealed and reenacted by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 296, § 
9-101; renumbered by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102; current version at MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994». The Skeenses contended that § 
3-602(a)(4) of the Maryland Code was not applicable in this case since Debra 
Skeens and Paterno had never married. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 58-60, 480 
A.2d at 825-26. They argued that the 1981 amendment to § 3-602(a)(4) limited 
a court's authority to grant grandparental visitation in only those situations 
where a marriage had terminated. Id. at 58, 480 A.2d at 825. The court, 
however, rejected the Skeenses contention. Id. at 59-61, 480 A.2d at 825-26. 
Although the court conceded that the statute could be subject to such an 
interpretation, the court ultimately held that § 3-602(a)(4) "does no more than 
restate existing law as to grandpa rental visitation rights in a termination of 
marriage context." Id. at 59-61, 480 A.2d at 825-26. Thus, the statute does 
not limit the power of a court in considering requests by grandparents for 
custody and visitation under other circumstances. Id. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826. 
57. /d. 
58. /d., 
59. [d. (citations omitted). The court's proposal that grandparental visitation should 
be based upon exceptional circumstances is dictum. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 
330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993). The court did not explore this 
proposition further because it determined that the father's absence on naval 
duty constituted an exceptional circumstance. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480 
A.2d at 826. Therefore, because this exceptional circumstance existed, the court 
automatically awarded the paternal grandparents visitation privileges. Id. at 
61-62,480 A.2d at 826-27. 
In support of this dictum, the court made an analogy between visitation 
and custody-':"since exceptional circumstances are required to grant custody to 
a grandparent over a parent, such circumstances are also required to grant 
visitation rights to grandparents. [d. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826; see also infra 
notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussion of exceptional circumstance 
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the father's absence on naval duty constituted such an exceptional 
circumstance.60 The only way the child could maintain contact with 
the paternal side of the family was through Paterno's parents.61 
Skeens is significant to Maryland law because the court pro-
nounced an exceptional circumstances requirement in the context of 
grandparental visitation despite the absence of such a requirement in 
the plain language of section 3-602(a)(4).62 It appears that the court 
adopted the exceptional circumstances requirement from custody law 
and incorporated that principle into the realm of grandparental 
visitation.63 At the time Skeens was decided, it had been well estab-
lished by the Maryland courts that exceptional circumstances were 
required to grant custody of a child to a third party over the biological 
parent.64 That requirement still exists today based upon the same 
presumption that as between a biological parent and a third party, 
the child's best interests are best served by granting custody to the 
parent unless exceptional circumstances are present. 65 
requirement in custody law). The court also relied on Chodzko v. Chodzko, 
360 N.E.2d 60 (Ill. 1976), and In re Adoption of a Child, 355 A.2d 211 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826. Since 
Skeens was decided, however, Chodzko has been effectively overruled by the 
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 
para. 607(b) (1983) (The statute provides that "the court may grant reasonable 
visitation privileges to a grandparent ... if the court determines that it is in 
the best interests and welfare of the child. "). Special circumstances are no 
longer a necessary prerequisite in awarding grandparents visitation rights in 
Illinois. The statute "enlarges the power to grant grandparent visitation beyond 
that which existed at common law." Lingwall v. Hoener, 464 N.E.2d 1248, 
1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Likewise, one year after In re Adoption oj a Child 
was decided, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that 
grandparents' rights are not derivative. Bennett v. Bennett, 376 A.2d 191, 193 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). The granting of such rights depends solely 
upon whether it is in the best interest of the child. Id. 
60. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826. 
61. Id. at 61, 480 A.2d 826-27. 
62. Compare Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61-62, 480 A.2d at 826-27 (determining that 
the father's absence on naval duty was an exceptional circumstance and 
awarding visitation rights to the grandparents) with 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 
(repealed and reenacted by 1984 Md. Laws ch. 296, § 9-101; renumbered by 
1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102; current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994» (setting forth as the only requirement for grand-
parental visitation "the best interest of the child"). 
63. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
64. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 177-78, 372 A.2d 582, 586-87 (1977). 
65. "When the dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, it is 
presumed that the child's best interest is subserved by custody to the parent. 
That presumption is overcome and such custody will be denied if (a) the parent 
is unfit to have custody, or (b) if there are such exceptional circumstances as 
[to] make such custody detrimental to the best interest of the child." Id. at 
178-79, 372 A.2d at 587. The burden of proof is on the third party. Id. at 
178, 372 A.2d at 587. 
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Skeens was the first Maryland appellate case to suggest that such 
a presumption also exists with grandparental visitation.66 In other 
words, Skeens suggested that without exceptional circumstances, the 
child's interests were presumably best served by granting visitation 
only to the child's parents, not the grandparents.6' Since the Skeens 
decision in 1984, neither the legislature nor the courts had affirmed 
or disputed the requirement of exceptional circumstances in the 
context of grandparental visitation until Fairbanks v. McCarter68 in 
1993. Before Fairbanks was decided, though, Maryland's grandparent 
visitation statute underwent two non-substantive changes, neither of 
which affected the Skeens exceptional circumstances requirement. 
The Maryland General Assembly first moved the visitation stat-
ute, in 1984, from section 3-602 of the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article69 to section 9-102 of the Family Law Article.70 While in 
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the grandparent visita-
tion statute was part of a broad section entitled "Custody, Guardi-
anship, Maintenance, and Support of a Child. "71 As a result of the 
move to the Family Law Article, however, the visitation statute stood 
alone and was entitled "Petition by Grandparents for Visitation."72 
A second change, made by the Maryland legislature in 1991, 
was clarifying in nature. The previous statute authorized an equity 
court to grant visitation rights to a grandparent after "termination 
of a [parents'] marriage."73 The 1991 amendment added language to 
the statute to clarify the court's power to consider a petition for 
visitation by a grandparent "after the termination of a marriage by 
divorce, annulment, or death."74 Fairbanks v. McCarter,7S decided 
two years later, examined Maryland's grandparent visitation statute 
in light of the 1991 amendment.76 The 1991 amended version of 
section 9-102 read as follows: 
66. See Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993). 
67. See Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 61, 480 A.2d 820, 826 (1984). 
68. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
69. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 §3-602(a)(4). 
70. Chapter 296 of the 1984 Maryland Laws recodified § 3-602(a)(4) of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article as § 9-101 of the Family Law Article. 1984 
Md. Laws ch. 296. Later that same year, the legislature renumbered that section 
as 9-102. 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529. 
71. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 § 3-602(a)(4). 
72. 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994». 
73. 1984 Md. Laws ch. 529 § 9-102. 
74. 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-
102 (Supp. 1994». 
75. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
76. [d. at 46-48, 622 A.2d at 125-27. 
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At any time after the termination of a marriage by divorce, 
annulment, or death, an equity court may: 
(1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation by a 
grandparent of a natural or adopted child of the parties 
whose marriage has been terminated; and 
(2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of 
the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent. 77 
After the decision in Fairbanks v. McCarter, section 9-102 
underwent yet another change-grandparents may now petition a 
court for visitation rights even though the nuclear family is intact. 78 
"An equity court may: (1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation 
of a grandchild by a grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be 
in the best interests of the child, grant visitation rights to the 
grandparent. "79 The marital status of the parents is now irrelevant 
in determining visitation rights of grandparents.8o 
III. INSTANT CASE 
In Fairbanks v. McCarter, 81 the trial court did not rely on 
Maryland's grandparent visitation statute. Rather, the trial court's 
opinion relied primarily on the teachings in Skeens v. Paterno. 82 The 
Fairbanks trial court asserted three principles in its opinion: 
[T]he first, and probably the most important [principle] to 
make note of, is that the ultimate test in any of these cases 
is what is in the best interest of the children. 
The second of these principles ... is that [when] you 
are talking about custody of children, custody awarded to 
grandparents as against a parent is only to be granted when 
there are exceptional circumstances. 
In [Skeens v.] Paterno the Court further notes that that 
may also be true with respect to grandparental visitation 
. [T]here is at least a [third] principle that absent 
other exceptional factors, the visitation or custody with the 
77. 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-
102 (Supp. 1994». 
78. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994); see also Beckman v. Boggs, 
No. 78, 1995 WL 119124 (Md. Mar. 22, 1995) (applying 1993 version of 
Maryland's grandparent visitation statute). 
79. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994). 
80.Id. 
81. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
82. Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 480 A.2d 820 (1984), overruled by 
Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993). 
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grandparents is in substitution of or in lieu of custody or 
visitation with the parent . . .. 83 
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As discussed above,84 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
proposed in Skeens that exceptional circumstances were required in 
order to grant visitation rights to grandp~rents. 85 In applying the 
principles set forth in Skeens, the trial court in Fairbanks determined 
that the issuance of additiondl visitation orders was not in the 
children's best interest86 because exceptional circumstances did not 
exist. 87 The court maintained that visitation with the maternal grand-
parents was not necessary.88 The children's mother had visitation 
rights and, therefore, the maternal grandparents could visit the 
children while they were in their mother's care. 89 
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's rationale.90 
Maryland's highest court held that, under section 9-102 of the Family 
Law Article, grandparents have an independent right to petition the 
court for visitation of their grandchildren. 91 According to the court, 
grandparents no longer have to prove the existence of exceptional 
circumstances when petitioning the court for visitation privileges.92 A 
trial court should be guided exclusively by the best interests of the 
grandchildren. 93 
In its analysis, the. court of appeals first examined the traditional 
rules of statutory construction.94 The court stated that .the words of 
a statute must be given their ordinary meaning95 and that a court 
83. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 44, 622 A.2d at 124 (citing Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 
61, 480 A.2d at 826). 
84. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67. 
85. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826. 
86. Trial Transcript at 66-67, Fairbanks v. McCarter (No. C4171) (Cir. Ct. Dorch-
ester County, Md.). 
87. The trial judge also noted that these children had more contact with their 
grandparents, maternal and paternal, than most other children have with their 
grandparents. Trial Transcript at 67, Fairbanks (No. C4171). 
88. Trial Transcript at 65-66, Fairbanks (No. C4171). 
89. Trial Transcript at 66, Fairbanks (No. C4171). 
90. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39,48-49,622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993). 
91. [d.; see also Beckman v. Boggs, No. 78, 1995 WL 119124 at *6 (Md. Mar. 
22, 1995) (holding that adoption of a child by maternal grandparents in no 
way impairs paternal grandparents' independent right to petition for visitation 
under § 9-102). 
92. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126. 
93. [d. The court of appeals also held that it was necessary to join the mother as 
a party to the action even though the trial court did not rule on this issue. Id .. 
at 46, 622 A.2d at 125. 
94. [d. at 46-48, 622 A.2d at 125-26. 
95. Id. at 46, 622 A.2d at 125; NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 124, 
544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988); Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., 303 Md. 230, 284, 
493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985). 
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cannot append additional components to a statute that are not already 
expressed in the statute itself. 96 
With the guidance of these traditional rules, the court of appeals 
held that the language of section 9-102 was clear and unambiguous. 97 
The court read the language as granting a court of equity the power 
"to consider and award reasonable grandparental visitation in fur-
therance of the child's best interest. "98 According to the court, 
"nothing in the words of [section] 9-102 suggests that only exceptional 
circumstances, present as conditions precedent, may justify an award 
of visitation to grandparents."99 
The lower court, according to the court of appeals, confused 
visitation with custody. 100 The trial court's reliance upon Skeens v. 
Paterno was misplaced. 101 In Skeens, the court of special appeals 
proposed in dictum that grandparental visitation should be based 
upon exceptional circumstances, as is the case with grandparental 
custody.l02 The court of appeals in Fairbanks stated, however, that 
"[v]isitation is a considerably less weighty matter than outright 
custody of a child, . and does not demand the enhanced protections, 
embodied in the exceptional circumstances test, that attend custody 
awards."103 The court therefore ruled that "[t]o the extent that Skeens 
v. Paterno indicates a requirement of special circumstances for grand-
parental visitation, it is disapproved." 104 
The coutt also stated that because, under section 9-102, grand-
parents enjoy an independent right to visitation, these rights are not 
derivative. lOS In other words, a grandparent's right to visit a child is 
not dependent upon his or her own child's legal rightsYl6 
96. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 47-48, 622 A.2d at 125; Harris v. City of Baltimore, 
306 Md. 669, 673, 511 A.2d 52, 54 (1986); In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 
521, 471 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1984). 
97. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 46, 622 A.2d at 125. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 47-48, 622 A.2d at 125. The court noted that other jurisdictions have 
imposed the requirement of exceptional circumstances in cases dealing with 
grandparental visitation. Id. at 48, 622 A.2d at 125 (citing Brown v. Earnhardt, 
396 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1990); Chodzko v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60 (III. 1976». 
But see discussion supra note 59 (noting that Chodzko has been effectively 
overruled). 
100. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48-49, 622 A.2d at 126. 
101. See id. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126. 
102. Id.; see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (reviewing the Skeens decision 
regarding the requirement of exceptional circumstances in grandparent visitation 
statutes). 
103. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126. 
104. [d. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. at 48-49, 622 A.2d at 126. 
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Section 9-102 calls for only a consideration of the child's best 
interest, according to the Fairbanks court. I07 A trial court, therefore, 
must only concern itself with the welfare of the child. In determining 
the best interests of the child under section 9-102, the court of 
appeals stated that the trial court 
should assess in their totality all relevant factors and cir-
cumstances pertaining to the grandchild's best interests. 
These would include, but not be limited to: the nature and 
stability of the child's relationships with its parents; the 
nature and substantiality of the relationship between the 
child and the grandparent, taking into account frequency 
of contact, regularity of contact, and amount of time spent 
together; the potential benefits and detriments to the child 
in granting the visitation order; the effect, if any, grand-
parental visitation would have on the child's attachment to 
its nuclear family; the physical and emotional health of the 
adults involved; and the stability of the child's living and 
schooling arrangements. lOS 
The court of appeals remanded the Fairbanks case to the trial court, 
with neither an affirmance nor a reversal, for proceedings in accor-
dance with its opinion. I09 
Judge McAuliffe's concurring opinion agreed with the lower 
court on the issue of exceptional circumstances. ltO He believed that 
"[u]nder ordinary circumstances and in the usual case, each parent 
should be willing and able to include visits with grandparents when 
the children are with that parent." III Ordinarily, therefore, it would 
be neither necessary nor appropriate to award separate visitation 
rights to the grandparents in order to accommodate the child's best 
interests. 112 Judge McAuliffe also stated, "[t]here is more than enough 
acrimony, heartbreak, expense, and suffering involved in child cus-
tody cases now; I am confident the legislature did not intend to 
exacerbate this situation by suggesting that grandparental involvement 
in custody and visitation disputes should become the norm. "II3 
107. Id. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126; see a/so 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version 
at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1994». 
108. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126-27. 
109. [d. at 50, 622 A.2d at 127. 
110. [d. at 50-51, 622 A.2d at 127 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). Judge McAuliffe 
agreed with the majority that the mother should have been joined as a party 
to the action but disagreed with the rest of the majority's opinion. See supra 
note 93 (noting that the majority held that it was necessary to join the mother 
as a party to the action). 
111. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 51, 622 A.2d at 127. 
112. Id. at 50-51, 622 A.2d at 127. 
113. Id. at 51, 622 A.2d at 127. 
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Accordingly, Judge McAuliffe agreed with the trial court that 
no exceptional circumstances existed in Fairbanks. 114 Judge McAuliffe 
noted that the mother had visitation privileges on alternate weekends, 
two weeks during the summer, and on certain holidays.1I5 The con-
currence also pointed out that the mother and her parents lived in 
close proximity and were not estranged. 116 Judge McAuliffe stated 
that these circumstances provided the grandparents with adequate 
time for visitation. 117 He concluded, therefore, that it would not be 
in the children's best interest to award additional visitation privileges 
. to the grandparents. I IS 
IV . ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
In Fairbanks v. McCarter,119 the Maryland court of appeals 
properly decided that under section 9-102 a trial court may grant 
grandparental visitation when it is in the child's best interest, despite 
a lack of exceptional circumstances. I2O Under the plain language of 
section 9-102, the court of appeals had no alternative but to decide 
the case as it did. Even a liberal interpretation of the statute would 
not reveal an exceptional circumstance requirement for granting 
visitation rights to grandparents. 121 The existence of exceptional cir-
cumstances, however, may be an influencing factor when a judge is 
determining a child's best interest. A court is to consider the totality 
of the circumstances. 122 If there is an exceptional circumstance, a 
court may be more inclined to grant the grandparents visitation 
rights. 123 By the same token, simply because there is not an excep-
tional circumstance, a court's inquiry is not necessarily complete. As 
exemplified in Fairbanks, a court may not automatically conclude 
114. [d. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
119. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
120. [d. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126. 
121. See 1991 Md. Laws ch. 247 (current version at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 
9-102 (Supp. 1994». 
122. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126. 
123. See id. (stating that "[t]he trial court must concern itself solely with the welfare 
and prospects of the child"). If exceptional circumstances exist, the child may 
have a greater need for stability and emotional support. See supra notes 23-29 
and accompanying text (discussing exceptional circumstances). A court may 
determine that such needs would be best served by awarding the grandparents 
of the child visitation rights. Thus, even though the Fairbanks court held that 
exceptional circumstances were not required to award visitation rights to 
grandparents, the court did not preclude the consideration of such circum-
stances. See Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126. 
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that since no exceptional circumstances exist, an award of grand par-
ental visitation rights is not in the child's best interest. 124 Rather, the 
court must consider all of the facts and circumstances to discern the 
child's best interest. 125 
Not only did the Fairbanks court properly interpret section 9-
102, but the approach contained in that section represents the best 
method for resolving grandparental visitation disputes. 
Each case concerning grandparents and grandchildren involves 
distinct differences and intricacies. Just as no two people are created 
alike, no two relationships develop alike. Furthermore, each case will 
unavoidably involve many intangible factors, such as the unique 
needs of the child and the strength of the familial relationships. It 
is for these reasons that a court, in determining whether to make an 
award of grandparental visitation, needs the liberty to use its own 
discretion. A judge should not decide whether to award visitation 
based solely on one fact or circumstance. The best interest of the 
child standard affords a court this flexibility. 
Concededly, the best interest of the child standard is not perfect. 
"Present methods for determining a child's best interest are time-
consuming [and] involve a multitude of intangible factors that oft-
times are ambiguous."126 It is true that the child's best interest 
standard is broad and vague,127 but the very nature of these disputes 
requires such a flexible standard. 
The sole alternative to the child's best interest approach is a 
more mechanical, objective approach. Such an approach would at-
tempt to limit judicial discretion, and thus make the outcome of 
such proceedings more predictable and uniform. The exceptional 
circumstances approach and the derivative rights approach discussed 
above128 are both examples of a more mechanical approach. Although 
124. The court of appeals in Fairbanks v. McCarter listed several factors to guide 
a trial court in ascertaining the child's best interest. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 
622 A.2d at 126-27; see supra text accompanying note 108. The court stated 
that the list is not comprehensive, and also that trial courts should "assess in 
their totality all relevant factors and circumstances .... " Fairbanks, 330 Md. 
at 50, 622 A.2d at 126. Thus, it appears that no one factor is determinative 
of the child's best interests. 
125. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126. 
126. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 419, 
381 A.2d 1154, 1163 (1978). 
127. Other criticisms of the child's best interest standard include: the notion that 
the standard is actually more focused on the parents' interests rather than the 
child's interests; the meaning of the phrase, the "child's best interest," is itself 
unclear and undefined; the standard is subject to judicial abuse because of its 
vagueness; and litigation is encouraged because of the uncertainty in such 
proceedings. Andrea Charlow, A warding Custody: The Best Interests of the 
Child and Other Fictions,S YALE L. & POL'y REV. 267, 267-73 (1987). 
128. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing exceptional circum-
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both standards may seek to fulfill the best interests of the child, they 
impose additional threshold requirements. 129 
The exceptional circumstances standard is too restrictive. It 
appears to presume that if exceptional circumstances do not exist, 
there is no reason to grant a grandparent visitation rights. A pre-
sumption of this sort is not always in a child's best interest. Consider, 
for example, the parents of two minor children who divorce. The 
mother gains custody of the children and the father visits the children 
once a month. The paternal grandparents, who had been very close 
with their grandchildren, live two blocks from the mother's house. 
After the divorce, the mother decides that she no longer wants her 
children visiting the paternal grandparents because of the bitter 
feelings that have developed between the mother and the paternal 
grandparents. Although the feelings between the mother and the 
grandparents have deteriorated, the grandchildren and grandparents 
still love each other. In this example, there are no exceptional 
circumstances. The father has visitation privileges once a month, so 
therefore, the children are able to maintain contact with the paternal 
side of the family. Additionally, both parents are alive, both parents 
are fit and healthy, and the grandparents live in close proximity to 
the mother .130 If the paternal grandparents petition the court for 
visitation in a jurisdiction requiring the presence of exceptional 
circumstances, their petition would almost certainly be denied. 131 A 
judge would automatically deny visitation to the grandparents simply 
because of the lack of exceptional circumstances. Under the non-
mechanical best interest of the child approach, however, a judge 
would explore all of the factors. Only after such a liberal examination 
stances standard); supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing deriv-
ative rights approach). 
129. Although the exceptional circumstance approach seeks to fulfill a child's best 
interest, exceptional circumstances must first exist before the court may consider 
awarding visitation rights to a grandparent. See Borzi, supra note 23. Likewise, 
under the derivative rights approac\1, the grandparent's derivative right becomes 
effective only upon the legal absence of the related parent. Fernandez, supra 
note 23, at 118. "The grandparent may then petition for visitation with the 
child, since the related parent is no longer able to ensure contact between 
grandparent and child." [d. 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29 (providing examples of exceptional 
circumstances) . 
131. See generally Brown v. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1990). In Brown, the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina denied the paternal grandparents visitation 
rights. [d. at 360. The court noted that the father of the children had liberal 
visitation rights, and therefore, the paternal grandparents could visit the children 
during that time. [d. at 359-60. The court held that the grandparents were not 
"entitled to contend for autonomous visitation privileges absent a showing of 
exceptional circumstances." [d. at 360. 
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could a judge determine that grandparental visitation would or would 
not be in the child's best interest. 132 The latter approach is more 
workable and less likely to lead to harsh and unjust results. 
Similarly, while simple to apply, the derivative rights alternative 
is too restrictive. 133 Under this approach, a grandparent's rights are 
not independent of the related parent's legal status. 134 Like the 
exceptional circumstances approach, this standard may also fail to 
fulfill a child's best interests. The fact that a child's father is not 
entitled to visitation, for example, should not automatically bar the 
paternal grandparents from visiting the child.13S Such an automatic 
bar may be contrary to a child's best interest, especially where the 
child and grandparents share a special relationship. 
The exceptional circumstances approach and the derivative rights 
theory fail, therefore, because they do not allow a court to determine 
what is truly in a child's best interest. 136 Both approaches are too 
simplistic given the complexities of the relationships involved., Only 
the best interest standard furnishes a judge the freedom to adjudicate 
these personal matters with an unrestricted sense of fairness. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland correctly interpreted section 
9-102 of the Family Law Article in Fairbanks v. McCarter. 137 The 
court made clear that grandparents have an independent right to 
petition a court for visitation rights with their grandchildren. 13B 
Fairbanks held that "[t]he outcome of the grandparents' petition lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, guided solely by the 
132. Fairbanks, 330 Md. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126 (stating that the "court should 
assess in their totality all relevant factors and circumstances pertaining to the 
grandchild's best interests"). 
133. See Fernandez, supra note 23, at 118-19. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. 
136. The hypothetical example that follows i1h:lstrates how a mechanical approach 
may fail to serve a child's best interests, but fulfill a parent's best interests. 
The father gains custody of his children. The mother is denied visitation 
privileges, and the father refuses to allow the maternal grandparents visitation 
time with the children because of the father's ill feelings towards the maternal 
grandparents. If a court applied the derivative rights approach, the maternal 
grandparents would have no right to visitation simply because the mother of 
the children had no right to visitation. Such a result may not be in the 
children's best interest if the grandchildren and the maternal grandparents had 
enjoyed a substantial and nurturing relationship prior to the divorce. It is, 
however, in the father's best interest, because he does not want the children 
to have contact with the maternal grandparents. 
137. 330 Md. 39,622 A.2d 121 (1993). 
138. [d. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126. 
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best interests of the grandchild."139 The child's best interest is now 
the exclusive consideration for Maryland's courts. Therefore, there 
is no longer a requirement that exceptional circumstances exist before 
a grandparent can be awarded visitation rights. Now, a court may 
award grandparental visitation absent exceptional circumstances as 
long as the visitation is determined to be in the child's best interests. 
The child's best interest standard is the best approach to the 
grandparental visitation issue. The very nature of these disputes 
requires an in-depth inquiry into the specific facts and circumstances 
of each family. Mechanical approaches, such as the exceptional 
circumstances and derivative rights approaches, are too simplistic and 
undermine the legislature's overall objective of fulfilling a child's 
best interest. 
Jacquelyn E. A vin 
139: Id. 
